Last week, the news was promising. Iran seemed prepared to agree to a multinational deal which would result in the bulk shipment of almost three-quarters of its known uranium supply, about 2,600 pounds, to Russia, then France for processing. According to the draft, the reserves would be irreversibly converted into a non-weapons grade form that could only be used to power Iran’s civilian nuclear reactor — which the country insists is the sole reason for its continued pursuit of nuclear capabilities. After the revealing of a secret nuclear enrichment facility in the city of Qum in late September and the subsequent allowing of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to enter it, such continued cooperation was met with optimism.
The implications of reaching such a negotiation are vast, especially considering the level of diplomatic deadlock that has existed here in the past. Though such an agreement wouldn’t necessarily provide any permanent solutions, experts say that it would set Iran at least a year back in any potential moves to produce nuclear weapons. This would serve as valuable time for the United States and its allies to return to the drawing board in pursuit of a more substantial diplomatic course of action. Furthermore, it would allow Iran to continue using nuclear fuel for energy and medical purposes while ensuring that it isn’t being enriched to develop weapons.
A day after the draft was reviewed, however, hope threatened to fade. The Deputy Speaker of Iran’s Parliament remarked that such a plan of action was “not acceptable,” though an official response from either President Ahmadinejad or Ayatollah Khamenei — the final decision makers — was still forthcoming. As the Friday deadline to respond to proposal passed, analysts wondered if the initial positive reaction to the deal was genuine, or perhaps just an attempt to stall.
On Tuesday, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the head of the Parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee, broke the silence. He announced that though the country plans to accept the UN nuclear agreement, it would only do so if some rather drastic changes were made. Primarily, Iran would prefer giving their uranium up incrementally rather than all at once, a measure that would stunt the primary goal of removing enough of the nation’s stock to prevent the development of a nuclear weapon. Many of the proposed amendments to the original deal have not yet been released, but Iran’s ministers have made it clear that they would ideally prefer the existing method of getting uranium — by buying it already enriched from other countries, or instead enriching it at home under the supervision of the IAEA inspectors– to this new plan.
Today, the news from Iran is again somewhat encouraging, though the UN still awaits an official response. Ahmadinejad spoke favorably about the proposal, announcing “We welcome cooperation on nuclear fuel, power plants and technology, and we are ready to cooperate.”
Though this positive response is a step in the right direction, it would be foolish to think that such ostensible support for the agreement will necessarily equate to Iran’s full cooperation in its passage. In the end, we must look at Iran as a country that is just as suspicious of the West’s intentions as we are of its own. While the West continually fears that Iran’s nuclear ambitions include the development of a nuclear weapon, Iran believes that it has an “inalienable right” to nuclear development — which it insists is a peaceful pursuit.
Giving in to Western pressure on this matter is certainly a contentious issue within Iran. Opposition leader Mir-Hussein Moussavi spoke today, illustrating the difficult nature of the proposed measures. “If they are put in place, all the efforts of thousands of scientists will go to the wind…If they are not put in place, the foundations will be laid for wide-ranging sanctions against Iran, and this is the result of a confrontational stance in foreign policy and the neglect of national interests and principles.”
In the end, it is incredibly difficult to determine if Iran is trying only to maintain its power of self-determination over its own nuclear program, or if it is instead attempting to pull the wool over the West’s eyes in a dangerous and devious move toward eventual nuclear ascendency. Since the onset of these talks, some reports have arisen that may generate additional support for the latter.
A recent article in Newsweek, written with the help of U.K.-based Plough Shares, concludes that Iran must be hiding numerous other nuclear enrichment facilities throughout the country. If this were the case, Iran could potentially produce a nuclear weapon much faster than analysts originally believed. Furthermore, it could signify that Iranian cooperation, especially in a minimized form, could amount to an action that does just enough to duck sanctions and avoid further scrutiny from the West. Whatever the scenario is, the clock is ticking. Both sides have sat down at the table — something needs to get done before the food gets cold.
Update: Iran has rejected the main part of the deal — shipping the uranium abroad. Sanctions on the way, or back to the drawing board?
tweedle dee tweedle dom 